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Quote 329 of 521

Yet the Air Force was compelled to take these steps [programs ... on
dispersal of bases and airborne alert of the bombers themselves] only
after realizing it would be in its interest to do so.  If the
policy-makers were assuming that a certain percentage of the planes
would get destroyed on the ground, that meant still more bombers for
the Air Force--to allow for the attrition and still be able to fulfull
the "military requirements."  And if SAC bombers were up in the air
flying around all the time, that yielded two bonuses: higher morale
for the pilots, who loved to fly, and a better chance of getting
"modernized" bombers sooner, since already-deployed ones will be worn
out much sooner. ...

Significantly, the only portion of the R-290/Gaither program that the
Air Force consistently and successfully resisted was the notion of
putting the bombers inside underground hardened shelters.  Officers
argued that it would be too expensive, maybe $10 billion or more, and
that it might not protect, ultimately, the bomber against radiation
effects.  But the real reason had more to do with Air Force interests.
With hardening, the dispersal and airborne-alert programs, so
advantageous to the Air Foce budget, might be cut back.  To spend
money on offense, not defense, was practically dogma in Air Force
circles.

Fred Kaplan, <cite>The Wizards of
		   Armageddon</cite>, pp. 166-7

Tags: airfoce radiationeffects militaryrequirements dispersal gaither attrition bombers betterchance realreason dogma sac circles airforce planes notion fly budget money